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In 1888, Rudyard Kipling published The Man Who Would Be King while living in 
Allahabad in British India. The short story follows two former soldiers on their quest to 
become kings of Kafiristan, or modern-day Nuristan in Afghanistan. The story was 
turned into a movie in 1975 starring Sean Connery and Michael Caine and is used at the 
Naval Postgraduate School as a teaching tool in the Department of Defense Analysis 
Military Advisor course. How can counterinsurgency theory and hard-won lessons 
learned from the recent battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan be better captured and then 
conveyed in a narrative format that will appeal to a wide spectrum of military 
personnel—from the most junior enlisted to senior officers? This thesis reimagines 
Kipling’s The Man Who Would Be King and sets it in the near future to test the premise 
that a fictional adventure story might effectively impart counterinsurgency theory and 
military advising best practices to otherwise busy and easily distracted service members. 
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In 1888, Rudyard Kipling published The Man Who Would Be King while living in 
Allahabad in British India.1 The short story follows two former soldiers on their quest to 
become kings of Kafiristan, or modern-day Nuristan in Afghanistan. The story was 
turned into a movie in 1975 starring Sean Connery and Michael Caine and is used at the 
Naval Postgraduate School as a teaching tool in the Department of Defense Analysis 
Military Advisor course.2 Over two hours and nine minutes, the film raises challenges 
that are still relevant to advising foreign militaries. 
Movies solve a fundamental problem for many service members who are faced 
with too many books and too little time to read. Volumes about counterinsurgency theory 
continue to pile up, and mastery of the subject requires years of study, a luxury not 
afforded to most soldiers, Marines, or special operators in the throes of serial 
deployments. Worse, despite continuous fighting in Afghanistan for over sixteen years 
and counting, the U.S. military has managed to continue to misunderstand and misapply 
the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency.3 
Historically, the U.S. military has a habit of forgetting counterinsurgency doctrine 
whenever it is between wars. From World War II to Korea to Vietnam to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, lessons have been systematically ignored or forgotten in the interwar years, 
leaving soldiers to have to relearn them on the ground. Ben Malcom highlights this 
frustration in his book White Tigers, when recounting and reflecting on his time as an 
advisor of North Korean partisans in 1952. He writes that, although unconventional 
warfare played a significant role in Allied strategy in World War II, “that knowledge was 
discarded or ignored after the war, so we came to Korea with virtually no institutional 
                                                 
1 Rudyard Kipling, The Phantom ‘Rickshaw and Other Eerie Tales (Allahabad: A. H. Wheeler & Co., 
1888). 
2 The Man Who Would Be King, directed by John Huston (Los Angeles: Devon Co., 1975), iTunes. 
3 For more, see: Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, Afghan Endgames (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2012). 
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foundation for conducting such operations.”4 Excepting Special Forces, the same could 
be said for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Iraq. Given this trend, it is reasonable to 
assume that unless lessons can be better captured in a compelling format that will span 
generations, the U.S. military will similarly stumble in future conflicts. 
How can counterinsurgency theory and hard-won lessons learned from the recent 
battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan be better captured and then conveyed in a narrative 
format that will appeal to a wide spectrum of military personnel—from the most junior 
enlisted to senior officers? This thesis reimagines Rudyard Kipling’s The Man Who 
Would Be King and sets it in the near future to test the premise that a fictional adventure 
story might effectively impart counterinsurgency theory and military advising best 
practices to otherwise busy and easily distracted service members. 
While the storyline remains true to Kipling’s original work, the characters in this 
reimagined version act in a way consistent with aspects of current counterinsurgency 
theory and doctrine. For instance, while Field Manual 3-24 on counterinsurgency 
promotes a “clear, hold, and build” methodology, this thesis uses an alternative approach 
influenced by Leites and Wolf in Rebellion and Authority, a foundational text in the 
Department of Defense Analysis Guerrilla Warfare seminar.5 This approach is 
summarized in the story as “disrupt, isolate, clear, and control,” and is focused on 
limiting supply to the insurgency. It is an approach that stands in contrast to the 
conventional “hearts and minds” approach promoted in the counterinsurgency field 
manual, which seeks to increase popular support and address grievances.6 
One of my premises in the story to follow is that the alternative, supply-focused 
approach adopted by Peachey and Billy Fish is also more understandable to the soldier, 
Marine, or special operator on the ground. Only by focusing on familiar military tasks 
with clear purpose are ground troops with limited counterinsurgency schooling likely to 
be able to execute an effective campaign. The difference between the “disrupt, isolate, 
                                                 
4 Ben Malcom, White Tigers (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), 36. 
5 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970); 
Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007). 
6 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 150. 
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clear, and control” approach and that advocated in the current field manual is clearly 
revealed in an exchange between a young Marine and the International Security 
Assistance Force Commanding General at a small fire base in Helmand Province in the 
movie War Machine. 
 
General: Your mission is to protect the people, not kill them. We can’t 
help them and kill them at the same time, it just ain’t humanly possible. 
Do you understand me? 
Lance Corporal: No, not really, sir. No. 
General: What part are you struggling to comprehend, son? 
Lance Corporal: I don’t know, sir. It seems to me that we are all here with 
our guns and shit trying to convince these people that deep down we’re 
actually really nice guys. And I don’t know how to do that, sir, when 
every second one of them, or every third one of them, or every tenth one 
of them is trying to fucking kill me, sir! ‘Cause I’m a Marine. ‘Cause 
we’re Marines. And now it seems like they’re handing out medals for 
heroically not being a Marine, sir. I’m confused, is what I’m trying to say, 
sir. 
General: Well, you’re just gonna have to get yourself unconfused, son.7 
An interview with a Marine captain in the HBO documentary The Battle for 
Marjah further highlights the internal struggle experienced by men on the ground as they 
attempt to win “hearts and minds” at gunpoint in what should otherwise be a fight for 
control; control they could effectively achieve by restricting resources from reaching the 
insurgents. As the captain puts it, “Clear the enemy out and let the people return. General 
McChrystal and every expert that talks about counterinsurgency … we pretty clearly 
understand now that the key to winning any fight like this is to control the population. 
Not control them but, I don’t want to use ‘win hearts and minds’ but that’s basically it. 
To get the people on your side and let them understand that you’re here for them.”8 
                                                 
7 War Machine, directed by David Michod (Los Angeles: Netflix, 2017). 
8 The Battle for Marjah, directed by Anthony Wonke (United States: HBO Documentary Films, 2010). 
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A second topic addressed in this thesis is that of the outsider-as-advisor. Just as T. 
E. Lawrence was famously “the man with the gold” to the Arabs, and North Korean 
partisans relied on Ben Malcom for critical fire support as well as essential supplies, in a 
21st century twist, Danny and Peachey bring lethal drones to the Nuristanis.9 With these 
they give the villagers they befriend an edge over the Taliban, and enable “their” villages 
to reclaim a tourmaline mine. In most instances, advisors should provide some sort of 
comparative advantage to their partnered force.10 This advantage can come in many 
forms, to include ammunition, money, or intelligence. Sometimes, however, simply 
remaining an outsider and providing objective analysis suffices. 
To remain a privileged outsider, however, includes resisting the urge to “go 
native,” which is a third element highlighted in this thesis. For the purposes of this 
discussion, going native is not so much a function of dressing like the locals as it is 
adopting the locals’ cause and making it your own.11 In the movie Farewell to the King, 
the colonel overseeing special operations in World War II-era Borneo warns his on-the-
ground subordinate, “You’ve got to stay British … You’ll never be one of them.”12 
Maintaining focus on U.S. objectives, not drifting toward local causes, remains a key 
point of performance for American advisors today. 
In this thesis, Danny and Peachey make an effort in advance to remain 
incorruptible outsiders when they sign their contract, swearing off alcohol and women. 
However, when Danny breaks the contract, the results are disastrous. Despite his desire to 
marry into the village, he will never be accepted as a local in the valley.13 
  
                                                 
9 Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac, Kingmakers (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), 208; 
Malcolm, White Tigers, 69, 113. 
10 Anna Simons, “Week Two: Imperial Encounters” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, 2 October 2017). 
11 Simons, “Week Two: Imperial Encounters.” 
12 Farewell to the King, directed by John Milius, performed by Nick Nolte (United States: MGM, 
1989). 
13 Simons, “Week Two: Imperial Encounters.” 
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II. THE MAN WHO WOULD BE KING 
A. CAST OF CHARACTERS 
DANIEL DRAVOT, an adventurer in search of riches from a gemstone mine in 
Afghanistan. A tall, slender American man with a big red beard who opens a small 
medical clinic in Er-Heb village. 
PEACHEY CARNEHAN, Daniel’s companion. A large American man with dark 
eyebrows and advisor to the tribal protection force. 
BILLY FISH, Peachey’s native counterpart and interpreter from Bashkai village. 
PIKKY KERGAN, an elder from Shu village. 
OOTAH, the Taliban puppet from Shu village who controls the gemstone mine 
through force. 
RK, the narrator and Lahore, Pakistan correspondent for The Northern Star. 
 
The story takes place in an isolated valley of Nuristan—a remote province in 
northeastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan—in three villages: Er-Heb, 
Bashkai, and Shu. 
 
B. GLOSSARY 
Arbakai—Tribal protection force. 
Atrozan—Ruling class in Nuristani social structure. 
Bari—Craftsman class in Nuristani social structure. 
Dustuk—The most influential village elder. 
Du-wrai—Temporary tribal government organization convened for special 
circumstances and dispute resolution. 
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Mala-wrai—Standing tribal government organization that supervises agricultural 
affairs. 
Mirab—Agricultural irrigation arbitrator. 
 
C. THE MAN WHO WOULD BE KING 
Better a strong dog in the yard than a strong king in the capital [sic].14 
 
The beginning of everything was in an airplane from San Francisco to Lahore.15 
The company was feeling the pinch from the congressional budget, which meant I was 
travelling coach, not first class, which is awful on a flight that far to that part of the 
world. The seat cushions were worn thin and the food was predictably mediocre so I 
bolstered myself with complimentary pillows and blankets, pulled out a pepperoni 
calzone I’d bought on the concourse, and scrolled through the in-flight movie selection. 
My row in Coach happened to be empty till I reached Dubai, when a big, black-
browed gentleman in shirt-sleeves sat next to me. We began some idle chit chat and he 
told me about his service in Afghanistan, and I discovered that he had an educated taste 
for whiskey. Since he hadn’t been back to the region in almost ten years, I filled him in on 
local sentiment from my view as a journalist at The Northern Star.16 As we talked, I 
noticed a Miraculous Medal around his neck. 
“If Afghanistan was filled with men like you and me, armed with some local 
knowledge and the will to get things done, Uncle Sam wouldn’t be $700 billion in debt 
                                                 
14 Tamim Ansary, Games Without Rules (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), 28. 
15 Rudyard Kipling, The Man Who Would Be King (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). This 
thesis is a modern reimagining and adaptation of Rudyard Kipling’s The Man Who Would Be King. As 
such, and in order to retain the essence of the original, portions of sentences and paragraphs have either 
been paraphrased or intentionally kept intact. These sections are marked with italics in order to differentiate 
them from dialogue. Character names and the villages of Er-Heb, Bashkai, and Shu are from Kipling’s 
original but will not appear in italics. 
16 The Man Who Would Be King. 
 7 
but $900 billion richer!” he said, and as I looked at his decidedly determined chin, I was 
inclined to agree with him.17 
We talked about Sacred Heart Cathedral and other Catholic heritage sites in 
Pakistan, and he asked to use my cell phone when we landed in Lahore. He was meeting 
a friend and needed to confirm his ride from the airport. “I don’t have a Pakistani cell 
phone, yet, and would like to save myself the roaming charges,” he said. I cautiously 
agreed, taking some small satisfaction in helping a fellow American and a fellow 
Catholic. 
When we landed, I lent him my phone and overheard him say, “Hey, Danny. I just 
landed. Already? Okay, yeah, let’s go south right away, then. See you in a bit.” He hung 
up and returned my phone. 
As we walked from the plane to baggage claim, he asked, “You know, there 
aren’t too many Americans likely to know as much as you about the region, and you 
seem to have a good pulse on what is going on across the border.18 Could my friend and I 
swing by to pick your brain?” Reluctantly, but because I was also distracted by a torrent 
of voice mails and text messages streaming into my phone, I accepted. I told him that I 
had some business in Allahabad but would be back in my office in Lahore in ten days. 
By then, our bags had arrived and we walked out to the arrivals walkway. As I 
hailed a taxi, a faded blue Toyota Corolla with dented bumpers pulled up.19 A tall, 
slender man with a big red beard stepped out to grab Peachey’s (my seatmate), bags—
this must be Danny, who wore on his right hand an antique ruby ring, which seemed out 
of place on such a rough-looking man.20 Peachey leaned in and whispered something in 
                                                 
17 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/
11, RL33110 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 2; John Shroder, Natural 
Resources in Afghanistan (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2014), 412. 
18 For more, see: Ansary, Games Without Rules; Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010); Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 2009). 
19 Matt Trevithick and Daniel Seckman, “Heart of Darkness,” The Daily Beast, November 15, 2014, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/heart-of-darkness-into-afghanistans-taliban-valley. 
20 Ben Macintyre, The Man Who Would Be King: The First American in Afghanistan (London: 
Macmillan, 2004), 214. 
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Danny’s ear and I could hear Danny say, “Does he expect me to give him anything? 
Cause I won’t.” Peachey looked at me and smiled, got in the car, and drove away. 
In the taxi on my way home, I reckoned that two individuals like the ones I just 
met could not do any good if they aimlessly gallivanted around Pakistan or, worse, the 
recently independent Pashtunistan. So I sent a text message to a friend at the U.S. 
Embassy in Islamabad, describing them as accurately as I could. I figured it would be 
better for everyone if someone other than Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence kept an 
eye on them. 
The following morning, it appeared that the bare minimum had been done by our 
new satellite editor so, before departing for Allahabad, I caught up on some work. 
I report from the Lahore office of The Northern Star, where I cover events in 
Pakistan and distribute the paper to Company employees. After Operations ENDURING 
FREEDOM and FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, the United States facilitated the partition of 
Pashtunistan from Afghanistan and Pakistan. An American viceroy now led all U.S. and 
coalition personnel—including Indian security forces—and could independently budget, 
contract, and develop policy. The viceroy, called the U.S. Trustee to Afghanistan by the 
Americans, reported directly to the U.S. president.21 Besides a small special operations 
strike force, the Afghan advisory mission belonged to my employer—officially named 
the East Afghanistan Company—who managed the contracted advisors and their logistics 
and aviation support. These contracted soldiers lived with their Afghan counterparts on 
two-year deployments and my job was to keep them, in part, informed and entertained.22 
Once I was back in Lahore from Allahabad, I set to work on the weekly issue. Our 
custom was to post the issue on Saturday night, which is to say Sunday morning. The 
Indians and Pakistanis, in continuous conflict of one sort or another over the disputed 
territory of Kashmir, were at it again following a U.S. announcement recognizing the 
                                                 
21 Rosie Gray, “Erik Prince’s Plan to Privatize the War in Afghanistan,” The Atlantic, August 18, 
2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/afghanistan-camp-david/537324/. 
22 Erik Prince, “The MacArthur Model for Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2017, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-macarthur-model-for-afghanistan-1496269058. 
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Indian claim.23 That night, I was waiting alone for an update from my man on the ground 
and stepped outside for a cigarette. While a blast of hot wind from the west hit me, the 
hoot of the night-jars and the smell that precedes the rain almost made me forget the 
miserable heat for a second. 
No sooner had I settled back into my office chair than I was startled back to my 
senses when two men in white clothes burst through my door. The first one said, “It’s 
him!” The second said, “It sure is!” And they both laughed as they mopped their 
foreheads. When they stepped into the light of my desk lamp, I recognized the eyebrows 
of the one and the beard of the other as the two men from the airport. 
“We saw your light from across the road and I said to my friend here, ‘The office 
is open. Let’s go inside and speak to the guy who tried to throw us out of the country,’” 
said the one with the dark eyebrows. 
How did they know I reported on them to anyone? “What do you want?” I asked. 
“Half an hour of your time,” said the red-bearded man with the ruby ring. “We’d 
like some drink—‘The Contract’ doesn’t begin yet, Peachey—but what we really want is 
advice. We don’t want money. We ask you as a favor, because we found out you tried to 
screw us.” 
I walked behind my desk and the red-haired man rubbed his hands while 
admiring the maps on the walls. “That’s what I like to see,” he said. “This was the right 
man to come to. Now, sir, let me introduce to you Petty Officer Peachey Carnehan, that’s 
him, and Petty Officer Daniel Dravot, that’s me, and the less said about our current 
professions the better, but he was a sniper and I was a medic while we were in uniform. 
Peachey is sober, and so am I. Pass me two cigars and watch us light up, to make sure. It 
will save you cutting into my talk.” 
I watched the test. The men were absolutely sober, so I gave them each a glass of 
whiskey. 
                                                 
23 For more, see: Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer (London: Picador, 2008); Husain Haqqani, 
Magnificent Delusions (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013); Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2004). 
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“That’s more like it,” said Peachey of the eyebrows, wiping the drink from his 
mustache. “Let me talk now, Danny. We made a go of it after we left the Navy and 
decided that the United States wasn’t big enough for us.” 
They certainly were too big for the office. Danny’s beard seemed to fill half the 
room and Peachey’s shoulders the other half, as they sat on the big table. Peachey 
continued, “The United States squandered an opportunity to profit from Afghanistan’s 
mines but the Taliban aren’t—we heard they are partially funding their new country 
through gemstones mined in the eastern provinces of Nuristan and Badakhshan.24 We 
know southern Afghanistan like the back of our hand—six deployments between the two 
of us—but never to those parts. So we came here to do our research, just like I asked at 
the airport. We figure there has to be some opportunity for us to profit as well. We are not 
little men, and there is nothing that we are afraid of except drink, and we will sign a 
contract on that.” 
“Yes, of course,” I said. “You’ve been out in the sun, and it’s a very warm night. 
Why don’t you sleep on it and come back tomorrow?” I motioned toward the door with 
the intention that the next time they arrived I would have the proper authorities present. 
“We have slept on it for six months and all we know is that no Americans have 
gone there (he gestured toward a spot on one of the maps on the wall) since the war 
ended. And the Nuristanis fight. In any place where they like to fight, a man who knows 
how to drill men can always be a big man. Oh, and we heard the women are beautiful,” 
said Danny with a grin. 
“But that is provided against in ‘The Contract,’” said Peachey. “Neither woman 
nor liquor, Daniel.” 
“You’ll be killed before you’re five miles across the Pashtunistan border,” I 
said.25 “It’s one mass of mountains and peaks. The Taliban are brutal, and even if you 
reached a gemstone mine you couldn’t do anything.”26 
                                                 
24 For more, see: Ryan Hartwig, “A Resource Network Strategy for Afghanistan,” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 
25 The Man Who Would Be King. 
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“That’s what we wanted to hear!” said Peachey. “Whenever someone calls you 
crazy, you know you’re onto something.” He turned to the bookcases. “A few maps to 
plan our route. We need to know something about the people, so how about some 
travelogues and ethnographies. It looks like you have some of those.” 
“Are you serious?” I said. 
“A little,” said Danny sweetly. “Your biggest maps and any books you’ve got, 
please.” 
At this point, my curiosity as a reporter overcame my fear, so I fetched a large 
map of Afghanistan and Pakistan, two smaller maps—one of Nuristan and one marking 
all of the gemstone mines—and all the books written about Nuristan since The Kafirs of 
the Hindu Kush. A thin stock, to be sure. The men dove into them. 
“See here!” said Danny, his thumb on the map. “We will drive past Peshawar 
through the Khyber Pass and turn north at Jalalabad. Then we get among the hills—
fourteen thousand feet—fifteen thousand—it will be cold there, but it doesn’t look very 
far on the map.” 
I handed him Men of Influence in Nuristan by Schuyler Jones while Peachey 
already looked engrossed in The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush by George Robertson. 
“The Nuristanis seem different than the Pashtuns,” said Danny, reading. “Says 
here, they have a caste system of landed elite called atrozan and craftsmen called bari. 
They handle most of their routine affairs through an agricultural council called the mala-
wrai and convene temporary councils called du-wrai for special circumstances and 
dispute resolution.”27 
“But all the information about Nuristan is outdated,” I protested. “Despite the 
American occupation for twenty years, no one knows anything about it, really. Here’s A 
Passage to Nuristan. Read what Nicholas Barrington says.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 For more, see: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2010). 
27 Schuyler Jones, Men of Influence in Nuristan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Academic Press, 1974), 
40, 63. 
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I smoked and finished my column while the men paged through Nicholas 
Barrington’s book and Natural Resources in Afghanistan. And they kept looking at the 
maps. 
Then, as I was beginning to shut down my computer, Danny said, surprisingly 
politely, “It’s about four o’clock now. We’ll go so you can sleep. Could we borrow these 
books? We will come by next week to return them and say goodbye.” 
“You are two fools,” I answered. “Sure, borrow them for as long as you like. 
You’ll be turned back at the border anyway. Why don’t you let me arrange an interview 
with The Company’s Human Resources manager here next week? You two seem like 
perfect candidates to be Afghan army advisors.” 
“Next week we will be hard at work for ourselves, thank you,” said Danny. “We 
will be back in Pakistan by winter and will swing by to show you our loot.” 
“Besides, would two lunatics make a contract like this?” said Peachey, with 
subdued pride, showing me a letter typed on a creased sheet of paper. 
 
This contract between me and you persuing witnesseth in the name of 
God—Amen and so forth. 
 
(One) That me and you will settle this matter together; i.e., to profit from a 
gemstone mine in Afghanistan. 
(Two) That you and me will not, while this matter is being settled, look at 
any liquor, nor any woman black, white, or brown, so as to get mixed up 
with one or the other harmful. 
(Three) That we conduct ourselves with dignity and discretion, and if one 
of us gets into trouble the other will stay by him. 
 
Signed by you and me this day, 
Peachey Taliaferro Carnehan 
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Daniel Dravot 
Both Gentlemen at Large 
 
“There was no need for the last article,” said Peachey, blushing modestly. “But 
it’s got a ring to it.”28 
Then the two ceremoniously downed their drinks and signed “The Contract.” 
“Now you witness it, and it’s legal,” said Danny.29 So I made my initials—RK—
under their signatures and scanned a copy, out of curiosity. 
“This is an idiotic adventure,” I said curtly. “I’ll walk you to the door.” 
I saw them off, still poring over the books and maps by the light of their 
headlamps as they walked out into the night. “See you next week,” were their parting 
words. 
The next week, I was closing the office when I overheard an argument between 
three local men wearing Chitrali caps across the street. One stormed away and I walked 
closer to gain a better view. Then, to my surprise, one addressed me in English. By the 
unmistakable ruby ring on his finger, I immediately recognized who it was. 
“Well, we are doing it on our own, then!” said Danny. “Peachey can’t talk their 
patter so I’ll be our tour guide. We’ll be in Peshawar by the end of the day. Put your 
hand under the bags in the trunk and tell me what you feel.” So I walked around to the 
back of their blue sedan and worked my arm into the mess until I touched two boxes. 
I felt the blades of something that felt like a small airplane. A drone. And another 
and another. 
“Twelve of ‘em,” said Danny placidly. 
“Heaven help you if you are caught with those things!” I whispered. “Guns are a 
dime a dozen, but a drone! A drone is worth its weight in silver among the Pashtuns.” 
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“Every rupee we could beg, borrow, or steal is invested in the trunk of this car. 
We won’t get caught—we’re just a couple of locals,” he said with a wink. “Before I 
forget, here are your books.” 
Overcome with astonishment by their determination, and with a perfunctory, if 
not quite heartfelt, nod to protocol, I asked them if they needed anything else. 
“Not yet, but we will soon. Goodbye,” said Danny, giving me his hand cautiously. 
“Today is the last time we’ll shake hands with an American for a while. Shake hands with 
him, Peachey.” 
Peachey leaned across the hood and shook hands. I gave him the rosary from my 
pocket. “For good luck,” I said. 
Two days later, a local correspondent in Pashtunistan, who was updating me on 
the latest news from Peshawar, wound up his email with: “I overheard two men at the 
American Club boasting about their plans to find a gemstone mine in Afghanistan. It is 
clear they don’t know the first thing about what they are getting themselves into.” 
The two, I thought to myself, are beyond the border then. I would have prayed for 
them, but, that night, another military coup was brewing in Pakistan, and the 
democratically elected government demanded an obituary. 
* * * * * * * 
The wheel of the world continued to turn and, three years later, I still was 
working at the The Northern Star. I worked out of the same dilapidated one story 
building on the outskirts of the city—an artifact of British India—and, besides the trees in 
the courtyard garden growing a few feet taller, nothing much had changed. On one 
particularly hot night, I waited in my dimly lit office for the last bit of news to arrive 
from my man in Kashmir. 
As I stood by an open window to catch the breeze since the air conditioner was 
broken, a sense of something disturbingly familiar came over me. The blast of the hot 
wind from the west, the hoot of the nightjars, and the smell that precedes the rain tried to 
conjure up a memory, but it was three o’clock in the morning, and my mind was foggy. 
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Then, a figure of a man—I guess you could describe it as a man—stood in the 
open front door of my small office building. He was bent forward, his head sunk between 
his shoulders, and he moved his feet one over the other like a bear. He addressed me by 
name—this rag-wrapped cripple—and asked for a drink. I went back to my desk, the man 
following with groans of pain, and poured him a glass of whiskey. 
“Don’t you know me?” he gasped, dropping into a chair. Then he looked into the 
light with a bearded face framed by matted grey hair. I looked at him intently. Once 
before I had seen eyebrows that met over the nose in an inch-broad black band, but for 
the life of me I could not recall where. 
“I don’t know you,” I said, handing him the whisky. “What can I do for you?” He 
took a gulp and, in spite of the suffocating heat, shivered. 
“I’m back,” he said, and gingerly rested his glass on my desk. “We went through 
the mountains—those damn mountains!—to get rich. It was all settled right here in this 
office—remember? Danny and I signed ‘The Contract’ and you witnessed it. You sat 
there behind your desk and I stood here and Danny here. Remember? Look at me!” 
Realizing who stood before me, a lump formed in my stomach as my mind tried 
to imagine what series of events would have left him in such a wretched state. 
“Carnehan! Of course,” I said, sitting back in my chair.30 
“Peachey Taliaferro Carnehan—the same and not the same—who met you on a 
flight to Lahore three summers and a thousand years ago,” he said.31 “We were like kings 
in that valley, me and Dravot. Poor Danny—oh, poor, poor Danny. That bastard would 
never take advice, even though I begged him!” 
Out of habit, I hastily reached into my drawer for my digital voice recorder and 
then, not wanting to spook the poor man, cautiously laid it on my lap and pressed the red 
button. I said, “Take another sip of whisky and tell me everything you can remember 
                                                 
30 John Huston and Gladys Hill, The Man Who Would Be King (Hollywood: Script City, 1974), 2. 
31 Huston and Hill, The Man Who Would Be King, 2. 
 16 
from beginning to end. Take your time. You crossed into Pashtunistan in your car, both 
dressed as locals.32 Do you remember that?” 
“I ain’t crazy—yet—but I will be soon. Of course I remember. Keep looking at 
me, or maybe my words will all go to pieces. Keep looking at me in my eyes and don’t say 
anything.” 
I leaned forward and looked into his face as steadily as I could, although I 
couldn’t help but stare at the hand that still held the glass. It was twisted like a bird’s 
claw from frostbite. 
“No, don’t look there. Look at me,” said Peachey, pulling his hand into his lap. 
“That comes afterwards, but for the Lord’s sake don’t distract me. We left for Peshawar 
in high spirits. We were going to be rich, and Danny was cracking jokes the entire way. 
We put up in a dingy little hotel…” 
“And then crossed over the Khyber Pass to Jalalabad,” I interrupted. “From there 
you turned north to Kunar and into Nuristan.” 
“No, we didn’t. What are you talking about? We turned north for Chitral when we 
overheard at the American Club that the passes were open straight into Nuristan. The 
Afghanistan-Pashtunistan border dispute was hot at that time and we couldn’t risk being 
caught.33 We loaded our gear onto two horses and headed up the Dewanah Baba—the 
Old Madman’s Pass.34 The two horses were overladen and stopped moving before we 
reached the top. Just as a storm was rolling in, two men with four fresh horses came 
along. Danny spoke to them in Dari and said, ‘Sell me your horses.’ The first man said, 
‘If you are rich enough to buy, you are rich enough to rob.’ But before the man could 
draw his rifle, I shot him dead, and the second man ran away. We loaded the gear onto 
the four horses and continued through those bitter cold mountains on winding rocky 
trails no wider than the back of your hand.” 
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“Take some more whisky,” I said slowly. “What did you and Danny do when you 
entered Nuristan?” 
Peachey finished his whiskey, drinking every last drop, and continued. “We 
finally made it into the first valley and stopped for breakfast at a teahouse; we had been 
traveling all night and were terribly hungry.35 The first thing we noticed were the women 
working in the fields, carrying wooden pitchforks and conical woven baskets. On our 
deployments to Afghanistan, we rarely saw women in the villages, but here the women 
worked unveiled, wearing red and black dresses tied around the waist with a wide white 
sash, moccasins on their feet, and long hair in braids.36 They were beautiful. We left that 
valley and continued over one high alpine mountain pass after another towards 
Badakhshan—we wanted to find a lapis lazuli mine there.37 Then we came out of a great 
forest of pine, walnut, holly, and ash into a big, level valley that stretched like a carpet of 
rich green. From our perch at the foot of the mountain, we could see all kinds of flowers 
alongside a meandering river and, when the wind blew down the valley, we could smell 
wild herbs.38 Our horses were exhausted and so were we, so we sat on our two boxes of 
drones and played our favorite card game—cribbage—using the dirt for our board and 
loose ammunition for pegs. 
“Then we heard the report of automatic weapons echoing off the mountains like 
thunder and saw fifteen men dressed in white turbans running down the valley, chasing 
five men dressed in black robes.39 The five men looked white—as white as you or me. We 
scrambled to load the horses. Danny said, shouldering his rifle, ‘This is the beginning of 
the business. We’ll fight for the five men,’ and with that he fired at the fifteen men, and 
dropped one of them at two hundred yards from the rock where he was sitting. We picked 
them off at all ranges—six in all—up and down the valley, until the last nine men in white 
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turbans retreated. Then we walked down the hill towards the men dressed in black. When 
we approached them, I was amazed—some even had blonde hair and blue eyes.” 
I interrupted, “Wait—tell me more about the battle.” 
“What about it? It was like any other—that’s not important,” Peachey continued. 
“So Danny greeted them in Dari and they said to him, ‘You saved us. Those men in white 
turbans were Taliban who seized our gemstone mine. We are from Er-Heb and are trying 
to take it back.’ Danny asked what they mined and they described a translucent blue and 
green gemstone. I said to Danny, once he translated what they said, that it sounded like 
tourmaline. By then it was late so they invited us to dinner. We went with them to their 
village where we were served a simple meal of cheese, barley bread, and tea.40 That was 
how we came to Er-Heb, just as though we had tumbled from the skies.” 
“Take some more whiskey and go on,” I said. Expecting an all-nighter, I drew a 
second glass and poured myself some, too. 
“During dinner we talked mostly about the valley, so Danny and I could confirm 
our route—our map didn’t show this village—to the lapis lazuli mines in Badakhshan. 
The men explained that Er-Heb was located on the east side of the valley, oriented on the 
south side of the mountains leading to the pass we had crossed.41 The Taliban we 
encountered had come from Shu, a village ten kilometers to the south on the west side of 
the valley, also oriented on the south side of the mountains leading to another pass. The 
Taliban were Pashto-speaking Pashtuns from Kunar, and it seemed their job was to 
defend the tourmaline mine from our hosts’ repeated attacks. 
“The valley was about one kilometer wide. In between Er-Heb and Shu was a 
third village called Bashkai, situated along the river in the valley floor. Each village had 
about 300 households, and the residents all spoke local Nuristani languages.42 Our hosts 
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looked like misplaced Nordic fishermen compared to the Pashtuns’ darker 
complexions.43 
“They said the tourmaline mine was located next to Shu, on the face of the 
mountain on the south side of the pass. As Danny translated, I sketched a map of the 
valley in my notebook (Figure 1).44 When everyone finished eating, one of the men, the 
mirab, offered to let us stay in a house that was empty and sat next to his. 
 
Figure 1.  Peachey’s Map 
                                                 
43 Barrington, Kendrick, and Schlagintweit, A Passage to Nuristan, 82. 
44 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2010), 30. 
 20 
“They didn’t just feed you and then kick you out of the valley?” I interrupted. “I 
thought people there hated non-Muslims.” 
“No, not at all. Their tribal code dictated that they host us, especially after what 
we did. Don’t forget—we saved their lives. But also, we made it very clear that we were 
Christians. I did, at least.45 When the elders began thumbing their prayer beads, I did the 
same with your rosary. Then the mirab saw my necklace during dinner and it led to a 
conversation about Mary’s place in Islam. Did you know she is the only woman 
mentioned in the Qur’an?46 Come to find out, we had more in common than I thought. 
“Anyway, the next morning, Danny and I decided there wasn’t any rush to leave. 
So, we agreed to stay and hear more from them about the tourmaline mine. While 
drinking cups upon cups of tea—too many to remember—we learned more about life in 
the valley, too.47 
“Their economic system combined agriculture with herding. While the women 
tended to fields of millet, corn, barley, and wheat, the men left for weeks and months at a 
time to graze their goats, cattle, and sheep in the high alpine summer pastures.48 A 
village government called the mala-wrai oversaw agricultural affairs, such as irrigation, 
harvest, and livestock grazing. They also imposed and collected fines—goats and cattle 
for serious infractions, cheese and grain for minor ones. The most influential elder, called 
the dustuk, presided over the mala-wrai, and new members were chosen every year at the 
vernal equinox at an open air meeting place.49 
“The men who weren’t busy tending to livestock carried butter over the passes to 
Chitral—the way we came—to trade for items they didn’t make in the valley; mostly 
caps.50 The passes, and often the main road, were closed from October to March due to 
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heavy snowfall, completely isolating the valley. That required disciplined storage of food 
and supplies. That’s one reason the mala-wrai was important. And then, there was the 
tourmaline mine—known locally as ‘The General.’51 
“Previously, the ‘The General’ was controlled by a valleywide council, or du-
wrai, consisting equally of members from Er-Heb, Bashkai, and Shu. The du-wrai 
oversaw rights to individual shafts and mediated disputes over conflicting claims. 
Tourmaline was mined using traditional methods—sledge hammers, hand drills, and 
pick-and-shovel—and then carried to Peshawar for sale and transport to China.52 Since 
farming and herding didn’t provide much more than basic subsistence, the tourmaline 
mine was a coveted source of income. 
“But once the Taliban got Pashtunistan, and it was separated from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, some Taliban fighters from Kunar ran off the small guard force and seized 
‘The General.’ These were some small clashes, like the one Danny and I stumbled on, but 
the villagers always lost. The Taliban backed a sympathetic elder from Shu named Ootah, 
who some people thought facilitated their arrival in the first place, and began collecting 
revenue. Ootah pocketed half of the revenue while the rest went to the Taliban 
representative posted at the tourmaline mine. 
“Since men from Er-Heb or Bashkai no longer had access to their tourmaline 
shafts, Shu locals and some Pashtuns from Kunar connected to the Taliban did all of the 
mining. Ootah guarded the ‘The General’ with men from Shu and a larger Taliban force 
was poised at the mouth of the valley, about fifty kilometers to the south. They controlled 
the main road and levied additional taxes. Besides the two mountain passes outside of Er-
Heb and Shu, the main road was the only way in and out of the valley. The villagers of 
Er-Heb, Bashkai, and Shu were still allowed to rule themselves in their traditional way, 
but the profits from the ‘The General’ were gone. 
“Already, by our second afternoon staying in the mirab’s spare house, Danny 
started what became an impromptu clinic in the living room of our house to treat small 
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ailments and injuries. It turned out, the mirab’s daughter, named Roxanne, wanted to 
become a doctor. She translated for the non-Dari speaking villagers and helped treat 
female patients. 
“Over the next couple of weeks, between Danny’s conversations, my own probing 
treks around the valley with various men of Er-Heb, and endless cups of tea, we gained a 
pretty good local knowledge. 
“One day, during one of these treks with the mirab, I passed through Bashkai so 
he could invite their mala-wrai to Er-Heb to discuss a small matter regarding the summer 
pastures. Danny sometimes came along to translate, but this time I was on my own with 
the mirab. As we approached the village, I heard a voice from between two buildings. ‘I 
say… are you American, please?’53 I swung my head and saw a man walking towards 
me. I answered yes, and asked how he knew English. He responded that he had been an 
interpreter for a Special Forces A-Team in Wardak Province. Then he gave me his life 
story. He spoke fast, but what I picked up was that he was from the lower, craftsman 
class, or bari, and that he was a member of Bashkai’s mala-wrai. He would be present for 
the meeting of the two villages. 
“Two nights later, Danny and I attended the meeting between Er-Heb and 
Bashkai. We wore our uniforms since they were our cleanest clothes and we wanted to 
stand apart from the villagers. The elders arrived, wearing their Chitrali caps, 
embroidered jackets over cotton shirts, brown trousers over black leggings, moccasins, 
and with a dagger tucked into their wide belts.54 They also carried ceremonial axes.55 
Danny elbowed me and said he wanted one for himself. 
“After the matter regarding the summer pastures was settled, which didn’t take 
long, the conversation turned to the tourmaline mine. One of the fighters who Danny and 
I had met on our first day made a lengthy case for retaking the ‘The General.’ I whispered 
to Danny that this might be our chance and he agreed. He then proclaimed that we could 
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assist their cause and that we had special weapons in our kit. Danny described them as 
small rockets that we could control from the ground, and that we would use these 
‘kamikaze’ drones in their service. All we asked in return was four horses’ worth of 
tourmaline when the job was done. 
“Then the bari man, who was tending the fire, spoke up and said that, due to his 
credentials, he would assist Danny and me. He said that we should start by securing Er-
Heb to serve as a staging area from which to operate.56 Danny responded that I would be 
the bari man’s advisor—though it would turn out the other way around—and would 
support the villagers with the drones, kind of like Ben Malcom did for the North Korean 
partisans.57 Danny said that he would continue to run the clinic. Both mala-wrais 
enthusiastically agreed and the bari man said he would move into our house. 
“When the meeting ended, I walked with the bari man (who went by the 
nickname his Special Forces A-Team in Wardak gave him: Billy Fish) back to our house 
and asked him why he volunteered to help. He said, ‘During the war, I had an important 
job and did well as an interpreter. When I returned to Bashkai, I was only a bari and no 
one cared what I had done. Leading this army with you will give me a chance to make a 
name for myself and pull my family into the atrozan.’58 
“The next morning, Billy Fish returned with a rucksack, his rifle, and a worn book 
under his arm. I was surprised to see the book. He informed me it was a gift from his last 
team leader in Wardak. While he meticulously arranged his gear, I noticed the title, 
Rebellion and Authority, complete with a Naval Postgraduate School library call number 
on the spine.”59 
“Tell me more about this book,” I interrupted. “Did Billy arrive with a plan?” 
“Oh yeah, he had it all figured out. We stayed up late that night discussing his 
plan and, frankly, I was surprised. I’d always been taught how important winning ‘hearts 
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and minds’ was. That was what was preached during my tours in Afghanistan. But Billy 
had a different approach, influenced by this book. So I started reading it that night, too. 
And from what I remember, Leites and Wolf said that since ‘demand conditions,’ or 
‘hearts and minds,’ are less responsive than ‘supply conditions,’ like people and materiel, 
then it would be more efficient to focus on the supply side, especially if progress lacks 
behind promises.60 
“Billy knew that, in order to win, we didn’t necessarily need the support, 
sympathy, or loyalty of the villagers.61 In fact, Ootah and the Taliban, although 
supported by a small portion of the population in Shu who benefited from their actions, 
enjoyed almost total control. Barging into a village and trying to win ‘hearts and minds’ 
at gunpoint was an uphill battle. 
“So, instead of the usual ‘clear, hold, and build,’ which is what the 
counterinsurgency field manual promotes, our plan was to ‘disrupt, isolate, clear, and 
control.’62 Disruption operations would put Ootah and the Taliban on the defensive, 
keeping them on the move. Then, we would isolate the village with observation posts 
manned by local police. That would be the equivalent of drying the river to catch the fish, 
to borrow a phrase from Mao.63 And then we’d be able to clear the village. Control 
would be established through a series of measures—the equivalent of using beat cop 
patrols and curfews in Baltimore. 
“By the end of the week, Billy had gathered twenty men nominated by the 
elders—the original five plus another fifteen from the village—who would form our 
tribal protection force, or arbakai. Then we embarked on a two-week training program: 
one week of rifle marksmanship and one week of policing skills. Billy did all of the 
teaching. I was around, but tried to keep a low profile and really only interacted with the 
arbakai chief.”64 
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“Wait a second,” I said. “You mean to tell me you were going to do all of that—
‘disrupt, isolate, clear, and control’—with one unit? Just twenty arbakai!” 
“Well, you go to war with the army you have, to quote Secretary Rumsfeld.65 
Sure, in a perfect world we would have had multiple units in addition to the arbakai: 
Commandos, a Frontier Guard, and an intelligence collection unit. But the villages were 
relatively small and didn’t have a ton of guys to spare.66 This was the simplest solution. 
“Our first order of business was to build observation posts at the pass to the east 
of Er-Heb and along the valley road towards Bashkai. We convinced the mala-wrai to 
pay a small amount of cheese and grain to villagers who helped us with the construction, 
and we modeled the construction after their alpine huts.67 
“Once the observation posts were manned and Er-Heb effectively isolated, Billy 
and I then started to patrol with the arbakai through the village, especially at night. There 
were no Taliban, yet, but it was only a matter of time before they caught wind that the 
villages were up to something. Plus, they’d surely already heard about us. 
“The arbakai operated in pairs, our basic unit of measure, and our general rule of 
thumb was to have about a third of them on patrol at any time, day or night, in separate 
parts of the village.68 We especially wanted the arbakai who were on duty in the evening 
to stay out into the night—so-called blue-green patrolling—in an effort to reassure the 
population through constant and unpredictable activity.69 
“The last step in Er-Heb was to establish control through a curfew. Like I said, we 
had the arbakai out at night and were on the lookout for Taliban. The mala-wrai 
explained to the villagers that this would keep the Taliban from visiting them at night. If 
no one was moving around, no one could sneak into the village. The mala-wrai told the 
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villagers that they would be fined grain and cheese if they violated the curfew.70 Of 
course, we weren’t so hardcore that villagers could never go out or socialize at night—
they just had to clear it with the mala-wrai.” 
“What about a census and issuing identification cards?” I asked, since those are 
common control measures, too. “Why didn’t you use them?” 
“Those might be fine control measures in built-up areas—I remember reading 
about them, too, in the field manual. But in our valley, those tactics weren’t necessary 
since the villagers all knew each other. Every area is different and a curfew was sufficient 
for us. As it turned out, the curfew helped increase the legitimacy of the village 
government by demonstrating a capacity for control.”71 
Before Peachey continued, I remembered thinking it was remarkable that they had 
adapted bits and pieces of dense theory to their specific situation. 
“After about two weeks, we felt that our staging area in Er-Heb was sufficiently 
developed and the arbakai were able to operate on their own. I know that doesn’t seem 
like much time, but, coming from a place where almost every man owned a rifle, they 
were already good shots and they were very enthusiastic.72 They really wanted to take 
back their tourmaline mine. 
“Billy went to the elders and asked them to call Bashkai’s mala-wrai to discuss 
expanding from Er-Heb to Bashkai. 
“So, a few days later, Bashkai’s mala-wrai arrived and, once again, we found 
ourselves sitting around the fire in the open air meeting place as the men grasped their 
ceremonial axes. A feast was prepared and Danny, Billy, and I ate from tripod tables. 
These tables had legs fashioned to form horns. It took fifteen iron bars for ours, a sign of 
prestige. Billy was beside himself with satisfaction since the highest ranking men eat 
from tables built with eighteen iron bars, and it is rare for a bari to be included at all. 
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“I didn’t care either way—I was just hungry. Then we were served local wine 
from a large silver chalice, which we declined according to ‘The Contract.’73 After 
dinner, the Er-Heb elders proclaimed their pride in their new arbakai and their desire to 
restore mining rights to the valley. The Bashkai elders listened, but were somewhat 
hesitant—they feared Taliban reprisals, claiming that they lived closer to Shu and 
Ootah’s goons. 
“Billy interjected and said that, if the elders nominated twenty men, we would 
train them in Er-Heb and then move in force to Bashkai. Billy and I would stay with the 
arbakai to show our commitment until it was time to expand to Shu. Only after our 
reassurances and a few glasses of wine did the elders agree and said they would find an 
empty house for us to move into when we arrived. 
“A week went by before our twenty recruits arrived from Bashkai. We began our 
training course, much like we had with the Er-Heb arbakai, but this time we added an extra 
week to teach observation post procedures and battle drills. That went well, and then, when 
they were ready, we departed Er-Heb for Bashkai, leaving Danny in the clinic. 
“We marched straight from Er-Heb and set a blocking position on the valley road 
to the south of Bashkai towards Shu. The Taliban didn’t try to stop us, which was 
surprising since this was when we were most vulnerable. That actually made me nervous 
so I made sure I had the drones ready to fly. 
“Just as before, we arranged through the mala-wrai to pay villagers grain and 
cheese to help build an observation post at the blocking position, using the same template 
of an alpine hut. 
“The day after construction was completed, a few of Ootah’s men attacked the 
observation post. Billy and I had just sat down to lunch in the village when we heard 
gunfire to the south. We found some of the other arbakai and, after about ten minutes of 
continuous fighting, realized that they were at a stalemate, evenly matched in firepower. I 
ran back to our house, launched a drone and struck a group of the enemy fighters grouped 
                                                 
73 Jones, Men of Influence in Nuristan, 182, 170. 
 28 
behind a boulder alongside the river. This broke the enemy’s fire long enough for our 
arbakai to maneuver, just like we taught them in their third week of training. Within 
twenty minutes, the arbakai had routed the enemy from their positions along the river and 
forced their retreat back to Shu. We had our first victory. 
“My slow response with the strike, though, made it clear that we needed a way to 
talk to the observation posts. So Billy arranged for some villagers who were traveling to 
Jalalabad that week to purchase some push-to-talk radios. When the radios arrived, we 
issued two per observation post so they could call Billy during an attack. We agreed that 
Billy would tell me if we needed to launch a drone. 
“Our arbakai in Bashkai used the same patrol tactics that we used in Er-Heb, but 
this time the Taliban didn’t stay away. A week after our victory at the observation post, a 
pair of arbakai on a blue-green patrol came across some Taliban, who they scared away. 
Over the next three weeks, the Taliban delivered a few night letters—mainly threats of 
reprisals if we expanded towards ‘The General’—but our unpredictable, deterrent tactics 
prevented any major influx. Around the same time, we instituted a curfew with the same 
fines of grain and cheese. 
“After about a month, we were well established in Er-Heb and Bashkai. The 
arbakai were also operating well on their own. The villages were secure. One way we 
knew we were doing well is that the Taliban, fearing the worst, began to send fighters up 
from the mouth of the valley, and our observation posts repelled numerous attacks. The 
attacks came mostly in the evening, about thirty minutes before sunset. We could tell 
whenever the Taliban were trying to overrun an observation post by the volume of fire 
and aggressive tactics. When an attack began, the arbakai would radio Billy who, if 
necessary, would request a drone—I ended up conducting three strikes. The confidence 
of our arbakai increased with every attack they repelled. 
“By now, Billy’s and my house was a happening spot—villagers from Bashkai 
and Er-Heb would regularly show up unannounced to chat. We would, of course, make 
tea and hear them out, sometimes over several hours, many cups of tea, and late into the 
night. After a while, I remembered the ‘coffee klatsches’ that Edward Lansdale hosted for 
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Filipino government officials during the Huk Rebellion.74 So, once a week we would 
invite the arbakai and elders from the mala-wrai to tea for informal discussions about 
whatever was on their minds—usually ‘The General.’ It also turned out to be a great way 
for me to recommend slight adjustments to the arbakai or provide an objective opinion to 
a village dispute. The ‘tea klatsch’ sessions also allowed Billy and me to expand our 
informal influence among the villages, especially regarding the reformation of the 
valleywide council to manage the tourmaline mine. 
“One of the better ideas from our ‘tea klatsch’ sessions was a slogan proposed by 
one of the Bashkai arbakai: ‘Our Valley, Our Tourmaline, Our Pride.’75 The idea was to 
reinforce to the villagers that the arbakai were there for them, to remove the Taliban 
puppet Ootah, restore tourmaline mining rights to the entire valley, and ensure nothing 
like this ever happened again. This sounds obvious but, in a valley where arbakai did not 
exist previously, it was important to reinforce this message. So, we hired a local bari 
craftsman to create small signs and posted them around Bashkai and Er-Heb. We even 
were able to sneak a few into Shu, although those didn’t last long. 
“Late one evening, not long after the attacks tailed off, Billy and I received a 
knock on our door from two of the arbakai. They said an elder from Shu was waiting in 
the open air meeting place with some of the elders from Bashkai. By this time, it was 
September and the air was cold, so I pulled my heaviest down jacket close as we huddled 
near the fire. The elder from Shu, who I called Pikky Kergan after a guy he resembled in 
my first platoon, was requesting arbakai and said he already had a house picked out for 
us. He told us that a few of his villagers still mined some of the smaller shafts, but they 
were being taxed so heavily by Ootah that the profits were hardly worth the effort. He 
said that more and more Pashtuns from Kunar affiliated with the Taliban were also 
coming in to mine, and they were using dynamite, which damaged the tourmaline much 
more than traditional methods. 
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“Billy and I told Pikky that we would consider his offer. Of course, we didn’t 
really think about it, but we needed to test his commitment to see whether he’d come 
back to ask us again. When he did, we asked him to send us twenty men who we would 
train in Bashkai. We also told him to, slyly, pass to Ootah this message: ‘Abandon the 
tourmaline mine. Arbakai will soon arrive with the intention of returning the mine to the 
three villages and will remain in the area.’76 Pikky agreed to both requests and, sure 
enough, two days later twenty men arrived in Bashkai as promised. 
“While Billy trained the arbakai, I embarked on a heavy disruption campaign of 
drone strikes. I could afford to use the drones more liberally now that we had trustworthy 
villagers and arbakai. Anytime we got word of a Taliban checkpoint at the mouth of the 
valley, a massing of guards at ‘The General,’ or a night patrol towards one of our 
observation posts from our expanding local intelligence network, I would launch a drone 
for a strike—as I recall five in total. By the time the Shu arbakai were ready, the Taliban 
and Ootah’s militia were on the defensive. 
“Before we left for Shu, I made one last trip to Er-Heb to see Danny and ask him 
to join us to retake ‘The General.’ It turns out, Danny hadn’t just been busy treating the 
villagers and the occasional wounded arbakai, but he’d also been helping the mirab 
adjudicate some local water disputes. The villagers loved him, and he himself wasn’t in 
any rush to leave. Even so, he agreed. 
“Danny followed me to Bashkai the next night wearing his body armor over local 
garb. All of us then departed early the following morning for Shu. Two pairs of arbakai 
pushed past Shu and established a blocking position along the road toward the south. 
Another two pairs turned straight up the pass to block an incursion from the west. With 
the remaining twelve arbakai, Billy, Danny, and I crept up on ‘The General’ and, at first 
light, began our assault. Danny led half of the arbakai towards the small administrative 
building at the base of the mountain while Billy and I accompanied the remainder to an 
elevated position near the shafts. Once we were set, Danny and his arbakai moved on the 
building and seized it—no one was inside. 
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“We had captured ‘The General.’ 
“While Billy and I poked around the shafts to make sure they were well and truly 
clear, I heard gunfire erupt from the valley floor—word must have traveled quickly. As I 
rushed to the mouth of the mine shaft, I saw a rocket propelled grenade slam into the side 
of the building, kicking up a cloud of rocks and dust. Our arbakai opened fire and I 
quickly sent up a drone, routing the attackers in short order. 
“Leaving the arbakai on the high ground, I made my way down to the building. 
Danny came out to meet me, his beard covered in dust and his rifle slung across his chest. 
He was holding the rocket’s tail fin like a scepter. Blood soaked his left sleeve and I 
noticed a small piece of metal sticking through a tear in his shirt. ‘I’m okay,’ he said. ‘I’ll 
go back to Er-Heb to take care of this. You need to get to Shu.’ 
“So, leaving two pairs of arbakai at ‘The General,’ Billy and I took the rest to 
Shu, where we asked Pikky to gather the mala-wrai. We told the mala-wrai that we 
needed to pay the villagers in grain and cheese to build observation posts in the valley 
road and at the pass. Then, following the same manner as at Er-Heb and Bashkai, we 
placed the arbakai on a patrol rotation and instituted a curfew in the village. 
“After a few weeks, things settled down considerably in Shu. It turns out that 
there really had been very few Taliban in Shu itself and they were not well liked. Two 
villagers who had quietly supported them were fined one goat each. Even though the 
arbakai searched every square inch of Shu, Ootah eluded us. His capture was the final 
link we needed to ensure the valley’s security. 
“The Taliban, obviously upset about the loss of their tourmaline mine, attempted 
to enter the village on two consecutive nights one week after we secured it. But our 
observation posts at the passes and on the valley floor, with the help of two well placed 
drone strikes, turned them away. With firm control over the villages by the arbakai, we 
began to attract defectors from Ootah’s opportunistic lieutenants who were coaxed with 
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rewards of goats and tired of their hard life since we brought arbakai to the valley.77 A 
good thing, because I was out of drones. 
“With control established, Billy and I called the three villages together and 
suggested that the valleywide du-wrai be reestablished so that mining could continue in 
the spring. They agreed and said that, over the winter, each village would nominate 
members to sit on the council. Once they did that, the next step would be to divide the 
shafts and re-initiate trade via their traditional routes over the mountains to Peshawar. 
“The last order of business was Ootah, who was still at large. The Shu villagers, 
now feeling safe from reprisals, reported to the arbakai on his location at an alpine hut 
south of ‘The General.’ Shu’s mala-wrai talked to his relatives and summoned him back 
to the village. After about a week, he returned and was imprisoned for a short time while 
a specially convened du-wrai deliberated on his punishment. Ultimately, a hefty fine of 
goats was levied on Ootah and he and his sons were banned from sitting on the mala-
wrai, his social prestige effectively ruined. 
“With all of the action in Shu, I hadn’t seen Danny in weeks. So, once the matter 
with Ootah was decided, I made the trip to Er-Heb. When I arrived, I was a bit startled. 
Danny was wearing a white woolen coat with red and blue squares embroidered on the 
sleeve—a garment typically reserved for dustuks—and he had turned the rocket tailfin 
into a scepter and was carrying it around like one of their ceremonial axes.78 
“‘I’ve been meaning to talk to you about something,’ said Danny when I arrived. 
He was weighing his scepter in his hand so I knew something was on his mind. ‘Roxanne 
and I have been spending a lot of time together at the clinic. Winter is coming and I am 
going to ask her to be my wife.’ 
“‘For God’s sake, leave the women alone!’ I said. ‘We came here to get rich. 
Remember ‘The Contract’: keep clear of women.’ 
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“‘‘The Contract’ only lasted until we made a profit and we did that—‘The 
General’ is open so we can collect our payment,’ said Danny. 
“‘Exactly!’ I said. ‘Let’s cash in for our gemstones and get back to Pakistan 
before the snow falls. If you’re determined to break ‘The Contract,’ at least let it be with 
alcohol. I’ll see if Billy can run in some liquor from an abandoned Agency post. But no 
women.’ 
“‘Who’s talking about a woman?’ said Danny. ‘I said wife—a Nuristani woman 
to breed an atrozan bloodline. I’m not going back to Pakistan, Peachey.’ 
“‘For the last time, drop it,’ I said. ‘What happened to ‘plan your dive, dive your 
plan’?’ 
“‘I will marry Roxanne,’ said Danny, and he stormed away through the pine trees 
looking like a big red devil, the sun reflecting off his Chitrali cap and beard. 
“But marrying Roxanne was not as easy as Danny thought. 
“That night, I joined him while he put the idea to the mala-wrai. They were not 
the least bit receptive and Danny damned them all around. Before we left, I furtively told 
the mala-wrai, using the few local words I knew, that I would be collecting my 
gemstones and heading back to Pakistan. The next day I returned to Shu by way of 
Bashkai, telling both groups of elders my plans. When I arrived in Shu, Billy told me 
word of the incident had already spread through the valley. 
“‘It would be better for all of us if you could make Danny drop all this nonsense 
about marriage,’ Billy said. ‘You are good men, but even a good man with good 
intentions can cause a lot of trouble if he doesn’t understand what he is doing. I’ll go with 
you to Er-Heb to sort this out.’ 
“Back in Shu, I led two horses to ‘The General’ with a pair of arbakai and filled 
their packs. The next morning, we left for Er-Heb. When we arrived at Danny’s house, I 
could tell from the look in his eyes that he was drugged—probably opiates, still self-
medicating after his injury. Billy explained to Danny that, besides the fact that Roxanne’s 
father already had another suitor in mind, the other villages feared an undue influence of 
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Er-Heb if an American married into their village. The last thing they wanted was a repeat 
of the events in Shu. 
“But Danny wouldn’t have any of it and pulled on his body armor and helmet. 
Then he grabbed his rifle and stormed out to go find Roxanne, whose father had 
prevented her from working at the clinic ever since the incident before the mala-wrai. 
While he was gone, a large crowd of elders and arbakai had gathered around his house. A 
little snow had fallen in the night, and everything was white except the greasy fat clouds 
that blew down and down from the north. 
“About an hour later, Billy and I walked outside and saw the arbakai to our left, 
while Danny and Roxanne approached a growing crowd around the house. ‘Call up all 
the elders and let’s begin the ceremony,’ Danny shouted. 
“There was no need to call anyone. They were all there leaning on their guns. 
Billy Fish sauntered around and got as close to Danny as he could, and behind him stood 
the twenty arbakai with rifles. I ducked back inside the house to grab my body armor, 
helmet, and rifle. 
“Then the dustuk walked up to Danny and, pointing a finger at his face, shouted 
something in their lingo. Danny responded by grasping Roxanne’s hand and, when he 
did, a man from the crowd, who I presumed was her would-be husband, stepped out and 
began to raise his rifle. Before he could level his weapon, I shouldered my rifle and 
dropped him where he stood. Then all hell broke loose. 
“‘Run!’ said Billy Fish. ‘We’ll break for the summer pastures if we can.’ 
“I tried to give some sort of orders to the arbakai but it was no use, so I fired into 
the mass of them with my carbine and drilled three in a line. The valley filled with the 
crack of rifles and screams of villagers. 
“‘Hurry!’ said Billy Fish. ‘Make a run for it up the valley! The whole place is 
against us.’ So we started up the valley with the arbakai firing on our heels and Danny 
crying out that he was betrayed. The three of us covered each other’s movement until we 
reached the base of the summer pastures, and the arbakai stopped shooting. 
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“‘Drop your plates,’ said Billy Fish. ‘We must hurry past the observation post 
over the pass. We are done for if the runners get there before us.’ 
“Danny refused and began swearing as I tried my best to calm him. 
“‘I’m sorry, Danny,’ I said, ‘but there’s no accounting for the locals. Maybe we’ll 
make something out of this mess, but not until we make it out of the valley.’ 
“‘Let’s go, then,’ said Danny, ‘but, I will come back here and sweep the valley so 
there isn’t a living soul left!’ 
“As the sun set we approached the alpine hut that served as the observation post 
and saw the arbakai we had trained waiting outside with their rifles. 
“‘The runners have been quick,’ said Billy Fish, with a little bit of a laugh. ‘They 
are waiting for us.’ 
“Three or four men began to fire from the alpine hut, and a round hit Danny in the 
leg. That brought him to his senses. We crouched behind a rock and I wished for a drone. 
“‘We’re done,’ he said. ‘This is all my fault. Get back, Billy Fish—you’ve done 
what you could. Now cut for it. Peachey,’ he said, ‘shake hands with me and go along 
with Billy. Maybe they won’t kill you. I’ll go and meet them alone. It’s me that did it.’ 
“‘Go?’ I said. ‘Go to hell, Danny! I’m here with you. Billy Fish, you clear out, 
and we will continue alone.’ 
“‘I fought alongside the Americans for years in Wardak and they were always 
good to me,’ said Billy Fish, quietly. ‘I will stay with you.’ So Danny and Billy Fish and I 
aimed our rifles at the hut. It was cold. I can still feel it now.” 
By this time, the sun was up and the perspiration poured down my face and 
splashed on the desk as I leaned forward. Peachey was shivering, and I feared that his 
mind might go. I wiped my face, took a fresh grip of his hands, and said, “What 
happened after that?” 
“Billy was hit first as the three of us maneuvered up the mountain pass. Danny 
and I continued and, as we approached the crest, he stopped. 
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“‘There’s no way we’re both going to make it,’ he said. ‘This was quite an 
adventure, Peachey. I’ll draw their fire. You go on.’ Before I could respond, he put this in 
my hand and took off singing the ‘Star-Spangled Banner.’” 
Then Peachey put an antique ruby ring on my desk—I shuddered when I 
recognized it. Peachey rose to go and I attempted to stop him—he was not fit to walk 
alone. “Let me take the whiskey, and give me a little money,” he gasped. “I’ll go to the 
Embassy and ask to be put up until I recover. No, thank you, I can’t wait until you call a 
taxi for me. I’ve got urgent business—in the west—at Peshawar.” 
He shambled out of the office and departed in the direction of the Embassy. That 
day at noon I went into the city and, on the way, saw a crooked man with his hat in his 
hand, begging on the roadside. There wasn’t another person in sight and he was out of 
earshot of the houses. And he sang through his nose, turning his head from left to right: 
When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains 
And the women come out to cut up what remains 
Just roll to your rifle and blow out your brains 
And go to your God like a soldier.79 
I put the poor man in my car and drove him to the nearest missionary. He 
repeated the hymn twice while he was with me, whom he did not in the least recognize, 
and I left him there. 
Two days later, I asked the Mother Superior how he was doing. 
“He died early yesterday morning,” said the Mother Superior. “Is it true that he 
was in Afghanistan?” 
“Yes,” I said. “Did he have anything on him when he died?” 
“Just this,” said the Mother Superior, dangling my rosary. 
And there the matter rests. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
While this thesis has aimed to reimagine The Man Who Would Be King for the 
21st century in order to impart counterinsurgency theory and military advising best 
practices, an even more effective approach would be to adapt the story to film. As 
mentioned in the introduction, movies solve a fundamental time management problem for 
busy service members who spend months at a time deployed. In order to capture and 
portray hard-won lessons learned from the recent battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, it 
would be ideal if the Naval Postgraduate School or some other Department of Defense 
entity could leverage resident expertise to adapt this story into a screenplay and engage 
the appropriate entities in Hollywood for production. 
Why a movie? Film is the medium of choice for most deployed service members 
in their free time. While deployments mimic monastic isolation in some regards, which in 
theory should make them ideal for reading and study, the reality is that, to unwind, many 
service members spend their free time binge-watching television series, embarking on 
epic movie marathons, or playing video games. 
But watching movies and television series is not all indulgence. New York 
University encourages the use of video when teaching novice students a new subject, 
citing research by Robert Reiser and John Dempsey.80 In my case, my SEAL platoon 
received a last-minute change of deployment orders from a direct action-focused mission 
in Iraq to a grassroots counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, known at the time as 
Village Stability Operations. A film would have provided an easy, not to mention 
entertaining, way to introduce a complex subject like counterinsurgency theory to a group 
of special operators otherwise unfamiliar with the subject. 
In addition to the two movies shown in the Department of Defense Analysis 
Military Advisor course, The Man Who Would Be King and Farewell to the King, there 
are a number of other popular movies that illustrate counterinsurgency theory and 
                                                 




military advisor best practices. Although of questionable historical accuracy, Lawrence of 
Arabia provides a view into the life of one of history’s most famous insurgents. In the 
“Twenty-eight Articles” section of his book Counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen 
specifically mentions the movies Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers as must-
see predeployment movies for soldiers.81 Todd Greentree recommends Chinatown, The 
Godfather Part II, and Groundhog Day to anyone trying to understand America’s current 
situation in Afghanistan.82 Dances with Wolves, The Last Samurai, and Apocalypse Now 
come to mind when considering the perils of “going native.” The list goes on and on. 
All of these movies offer lessons into various aspects of counterinsurgency theory 
and military advisor best practices and, collectively, could be pieced together by a 
knowledgeable instructor for predeployment study. However, as often happens, this is 
rarely possible. None of these films has been tailor-made for the purpose of imparting 
specific, well-researched lessons to busy and easily distracted viewers. 
Learning from film also makes sense given the “stickiness” of video content. For 
example, consider advertisers who increasingly turn to video over print to reach potential 
customers. According to Entrepreneur, target audiences are more likely to interact with 
video content through sharing, a comment, or a “like” than if the same message were 
delivered via print.83 Additionally, popular social media platforms like Instagram and 
Twitter, which began with photo and text sharing, have begun to allow video content in 
order to keep up with this trend. 
In fact, YouTube, the preeminent video sharing site, has one billion users who 
watch one billion hours of video each day.84 While much of this content is frivolous, 
some is educational, and channels like the history-focused Crash Course have millions of 
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subscribers. Crash Course alone has over six million.85 Well-executed educational video 
channels have proven both entertaining and accessible to novice students. 
In addition to its “stickiness,” video can also convey information more efficiently 
than print. According to Forbes, the average adult reads at a rate of 300 words per 
minute.86 Using Writer’s Digest’s figure of 80,000 words for a novel (its minimum 
recommended length), it takes an average adult just under four and a half hours to read a 
novel.87 Data from the Internet Movie Database suggests that, if our nominal 80,000 
word-long novel were made into a movie, it would run about two hours, yielding a more 
than 50% increase in efficiency.88 
Again, in my case, the last-minute change in our deployment did not leave 
adequate time for training or study by any member of my platoon. Watching a movie, 
followed by a series of discussions, would have provided a certain baseline of knowledge 
from which to expand, offering visual examples of key pieces of counterinsurgency 
theory and military advisor best practices. 
None of this is to say that academic literature on the subject of counterinsurgency 
theory and military advisor best practices is not available to soldiers, Marines, and special 
operators. In the Department of Defense Analysis Guerrilla Warfare Seminar and 
Conflict in the Information Age, students read dozens of studies that use quantitative 
methods, among others, to present counterinsurgency theory. However, even if the 
readership of the publications in which these studies were published numbered in the 
thousands, it would still be far less than the millions who watch movies. True, most 
moviegoers are not service members, but, as discussed, soldiers watch movies as much as 
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any other demographic. There may be a general officer or a lance corporal who 
subscribes to Third World Quarterly, International Security, or The American Political 
Science Review, all of which have published articles on counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency and related subjects, but I have never met him downrange. In A Bell 
for Adano, John Hersey says, “No plan…can guarantee anything. Only men can 
guarantee. Only the behavior of men under pressure.”89 Unfortunately, no amount of 
research will change the actions of the soldier patrolling the mean streets and unforgiving 
mountains of a foreign country unless it is presented in an accessible and memorable 
way. 
Ideally, an educational movie, like the one that could be made from this thesis, 
would not only offer a “stickier” and more efficient method of imparting 
counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, but its entertainment value would also make it 
more enticing to deployed soldiers, Marines, and special operators. 
So, may the shooting—but a very different kind of shooting than most of us 
experienced in Afghanistan—begin. 
  
                                                 
John Hersey, A Bell for Adano, Audiobook, Recorded Books, narrated by David Green, recorded 
1989.89  
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